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Abstract
Global concern about human trafficking has prompted substantial
investment in counter-trafficking interventions. That investment, and
the human rights imperatives that underpin counter-trafficking work,
demand that interventions demonstrate accountability, results and
beneficial impact. How this can happen in practice is complicated and
contested. This article, which considers success measurements with
respect to criminal justice interventions, seeks to cut through the
complexities presented by multiple theories and elaborate
methodologies by focusing on one key issue: who decides success, and
how? A review of evaluation reports and interviews with practitioners
confirm that determinations of success (or failure) will vary according
to: (i) who one consults and their role in the intervention; (ii) the
criteria against which success is measured; and (iii) the assumptions
that are built into that criteria. Each aspect is considered with reference
to examples and insights drawn from recent practice. A major finding
of the article is that the lack of an overarching vision of what “success”
might look like allows mediocre or even harmful interventions to
flourish and good work to go unrecognised and unrewarded.
Key words: trafficking, human trafficking, criminal justice,
monitoring, evaluation, impact assessment
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Introduction
Global concern about human trafficking has nurtured great legal and
normative change. Over the past decade, it has also prompted
substantial investment in counter-trafficking interventions by
intergovernmental organisations, states and civil society. Initial waves
of intervention took place in a performance evaluation vacuum. This
was noted by, amongst others, the United States Government
Accountability Office which, in 2006, criticised the absence of
‘measurable goals and associated indicators to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of [US] efforts to combat trafficking abroad’ and echoed
the State Department’s Inspector-General in calling for ‘performance
indicators to compare progress in combating trafficking from year to
year’.1 Time, experience and heightened expectations about what can
be achieved have fed a demand for tools and mechanisms to make
sense of the problem and validate what is being done by, for example,
measuring the true extent of trafficking or evaluating the absolute
and comparative worth of an individual state’s response or a particular
intervention. A rapid rise in the formulation and application of “success
indicators” is one manifestation of the new environment within which
counter-trafficking is being discussed and targeted.2
Equally relevant are the recent but increasingly frequent calls for greater
transparency and accountability within the counter-trafficking sector,
including through rigorous impact evaluation.3 It is not difficult to
sustain a strong argument that counter-trafficking interventions,
including those in the criminal justice sector, should be carefully
monitored and evaluated. Certainly, the human rights imperatives that
underpin counter-trafficking work and the significant investment of
public resources demand that interventions demonstrate accountability,
results and beneficial impact. How this can happen in practice is more
complicated, and there has been relatively little analysis of the practical
1 United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO), Human Trafficking:
Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking
Efforts Abroad, USGAO, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 25.
2 See: A Gallagher and J Chuang, ‘The Use of Indicators to Measure Government
Responses to Human Trafficking’ in B Kingsbury and S Merry, Indicators as a
Tool of Global Governance, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2012.
3 G Baumann, ‘Measuring Effectiveness of Counter-Slavery Work’, Free the
Slaves, Washington, DC, 2006; G Danailova-Trainor, ‘Evaluation of Counter-
Trafficking Programmes and Research’ in C Aghazarm, F Laczko, et al., Human
Trafficking: New directions for research, International Organization for
Migration (IOM), Geneva, 2008, pp. 44—56; M Dottridge, ‘Research Needs
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issues and challenges that may arise in efforts to evaluate counter-
trafficking work. In our view, discussions of counter-trafficking
evaluations should identify and acknowledge these obstacles and
constraints, and consider what might be done to accommodate or
overcome them.
Impact and effectiveness evaluation in the context of international
development is complicated and contested. Multiple theories and
elaborate methodologies abound, and these can present a daunting
impediment to those seeking practical guidance in determining “what
works”. This article has sought to cut through some of these
complexities by focusing on several basic issues that are directly
implicated in evaluating counter-trafficking interventions in the criminal
justice sector. The key question is: who decides, and how?
Determinations of success (or failure) are likely to vary according to
who one consults and their role in the intervention, as well as, most
importantly, the criteria against which success is measured and the
assumptions that are built into that criteria. By addressing this
Concerning the Monitoring, Evaluation and Impact Assessment of Both Research
about Human Trafficking and Projects and Programmes to Address Human
Trafficking’ in C Aghazarm, F Laczko, et al., Human Trafficking: New directions
for research, IOM, Geneva, 2008, pp. 57—71; M Dottridge, ‘Measuring
Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union: An assessment
manual’, European Commission (Paper prepared for the Directorate-General
Justice, Freedom and Security European Commission), 2007; M Friedman, ‘This
story could have been written 10 years ago. We need to do more’ Rights Work:
www.rightswork.org, online publication, 15 August 2011; Global Alliance Against
Traffic in Women (GAATW), Collateral Damage: The impact of anti-trafficking
measures on human rights around the world, GAATW, Bangkok, 2007; GAATW,
C Hames, F Dewar, and R Napier-Moore, Feeling Good about Feeling Bad…A
global review of evaluation in counter-trafficking initiatives, GAATW, Bangkok,
2010; J Intili, et al., An Evaluation Framework for USAID-Funded TIP Prevention
and Victim Protection Programs, Social Transition Team, Office of Democracy,
Governance and Social Transition of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID/E&E/DGST), Washington, DC, 2009; IOM, Handbook on
Performance Indicators for Counter-Trafficking Projects, IOM, Geneva, 2008;
A Jordan, ‘More Funding for Impact Assessments?’ Rights Work:
www.rightswork.org, online publication, 15 October 2010; R Rosenberg, Best
Practices for Programming to Protect and Assist Victims of Trafficking in
Europe and Eurasia, USAID/E&E/DGST, Washington, DC, 2008; R Surtees, Re/
integration of Trafficked Persons: Developing monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms, KBF, Brussels, and NEXUS Institute, Washington, 2009; USGAO,
Human Trafficking: Monitoring and evaluation of international projects are
limited, but experts suggest improvements, USGAO, Washington, DC, 2007; E
Williamson, et al., Where is the Research on Human Trafficking and the
Evaluation of Counter-Trafficking Efforts?, ICF International, 2008.
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question, the authors seek to contribute, in a practical way, to current
discussions about how trafficking-related interventions can be
effectively evaluated.
Several limitations of focus deserve to be flagged upfront. The first is
the article’s attention to the criminal justice side of counter-trafficking
responses: interventions that are directed primarily at strengthening
the investigation, prosecution and/or adjudication of trafficking-related
cases, as well as the applicable legal framework. Typical “criminal
justice sector” interventions include support for criminal law reform;
training of police, prosecutors and judges; direct support for
investigations and prosecutions; and institutional reform (for example,
capacity building of institutions such as specialist investigation units,
prosecutorial offices and courts, and development of procedures and
protocols governing investigations and prosecutions). While some of
the article’s findings may be applicable to different areas of counter-
trafficking work such as prevention and victim assistance, others are
specific to the criminal justice response. A second limitation relates
to the focus on externally supported interventions: those that are
funded (and typically also developed, managed and evaluated) by
bilateral and multilateral donors. While certain conclusions implicate
key actors in international development cooperation, such as donors
and their evaluators, the issues raised are ultimately relevant to any
counter-trafficking intervention, including those initiated, funded and
implemented by national governments. It is also important to note
that the analysis is limited to just a few of the relevant issues—a
consideration of stakeholders, criteria and selected underlying
assumptions. A broader study, of which the present article forms part,
will extend this analysis to include matters such as data availability,
accessibility and quality; resources; and identification of unintended
negative consequences.4
The article (and the study of which it forms a part) is based on a
review of relevant literature including a selection of evaluation reports
of recent externally supported interventions with a significant criminal
justice focus. Evaluation reports of interventions that did not focus
specifically on criminal justice aspects of the counter-trafficking
response were also examined for comparative purposes. While
4 ‘Assessing the Impact and Effectiveness of Counter-Trafficking Interventions
in the Criminal Justice Sector: A discussion paper on issues, obstacles and
opportunities’, Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons Project, forthcoming 2012.
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approximately half the reports utilised are publicly available,5 the
remainder were obtained and used on the basis of confidentiality. In
this regard, it is relevant to note that several major donors working in
this area do not release their evaluation reports. Confidential interviews
were also conducted with twelve individuals currently working in the
counter-trafficking field, with professional backgrounds in criminal
justice (law enforcement, prosecution, and the judiciary), international
law, human rights, development, and monitoring and evaluation.6 An
important, supplementary source of information was provided by the
authors’ own experiences of designing, managing, implementing and
evaluating counter-trafficking interventions in different regions
including Europe, the former Soviet Union and Asia.
1.  Whose success?
All counter-trafficking criminal justice interventions involve multiple
stakeholders, each of whom will be impacted differently and may
therefore have different (and even conflicting) views on what
constitutes “success”. Externally supported interventions increase the
range of stakeholders who will have a perspective on whether and why
5 P Cunningham and S Hong, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human
Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (UNIAP) Phase III (2007—2010),
Mid-Term Evaluation Report Final Draft, March 2009, executive summary
available from: http://www.no-trafficking.org/reports_docs/uniap_mte_
execsum.pdf., full report on file with the authors;  International Labor Office,
Independent Evaluation Report: Mid Term Evaluation: ILO Combating Forced
Labour and Trafficking of Indonesian Migrant Workers, available from:
www.norad.no/en/_attachment/106242/binary/5825?download; A Jones, et
al., An Evaluation of the International Justice Mission’s “Project Lantern”:
Assessment of five-year impact and change in the public justice system,
Philippines, 2010, http://www.ijm.ca/pageid/236#_report; NORAD, Evaluation
of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat
Human Trafficking, 2010, http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/
mainsite/activities/ct/Evaluation-IOM-CT.pdf; United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, Evaluation of the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human
Trafficking (UN.GIFT), February 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/
commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/UN.GIFT_Evaluation_-_final_draft_24Feb2011
.pdf; United States Department of Labor, Independent Final Evaluation of the
Thailand Sex Trafficking Task Force: Prevention and placement program
(International Justice Mission), 2006, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/projects/asia/
Thailand_TraffickingTaskForce_feval.pdf; USAID, International Justice Mission:
Counter-trafficking program in Cambodia: Assessment, 2006, http://pdf.
usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG806.pdf.
6 Audio recordings and transcripts of all interviews are on file with the authors
and journal editors.
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the intervention has been successful or not. In this context therefore,
the term “stakeholder” potentially includes the recipient government/
agency; implementing partner agencies and officials including
investigators, prosecutors and judges; donors; trafficking victims and
victim support agencies; suspects and convicted offenders; evaluators;
and technical experts. Each of these stakeholders may assess the
success (or failure) of a particular criminal justice project or
intervention in the counter-trafficking field using different standards
and criteria that reflect their own positions, interests and assumptions.
For example:
. Target government/agency: Has the intervention reflected well
on the government/agency—for example, is the government/
agency able to claim credit for any positive results? Did the
intervention help ameliorate internal or external criticisms
directed at the government/agency? Did it improve the capacity
of the government/agency to investigate and prosecute
trafficking-related crimes or have broader positive effects on
capacity? Did it support implementation of national laws and
realisation of national plans or policies? Did the intervention
result in any unintended and/or negative consequences?
. Implementing partner criminal justice agencies (e.g. police
unit receiving victim interview facilities, prosecutors receiving
training): Has the intervention raised the profile of the agency
in a positive way? Do the results of the intervention reflect
well on practitioners?  Has there been a measurable change in
relation to the criteria by which success is judged internally,
such as victim rescues, arrests, prosecutions and convictions?
Are perpetrators being deterred from committing future
offences? Has there been an increase in the number of
identified or assisted victims who are willing to cooperate?
Are cases being processed more quickly? Has cross-border
cooperation increased in ways that facilitated the work of the
agency? Did the intervention support a focus on high-end
exploiters or just the arrest and prosecution of small-time
offenders? Has the intervention supported common standards
and approaches that will encourage greater regional
cooperation? Is the donor satisfied with the results and thereby
likely to provide further assistance? Did the intervention result
in any unintended and/or negative consequences that could
reflect badly on the implementing partner?
. Donor: Has the intervention secured clear, unambiguous results
that can be quantified, measured and reported? Can it be
justified as representing value for money? Has the intervention
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strengthened important political or strategic relationships (for
example, with a partner country or regional institution)? Has
the intervention served other political or strategic goals—for
example, reducing the flow of trafficked persons into the donor
state? Has the intervention reflected well on the donor? Did
the intervention result in any unintended and/or negative
consequences that could reflect badly on the donor? Can the
intervention be replicated by other agencies and/or by the
donor in different settings?
. Victims: Did the intervention facilitate accurate and timely
identification of victims, their escape or removal from
exploitation and protection from further harm? Did victims
receive the assistance and protection they require? Did the
intervention facilitate greater criminal justice awareness of
victim rights? If so, did greater awareness of victim rights
translate into appropriate treatment of victims? Were victims
treated sensitively in the legal process with full respect of
their rights? Did the intervention facilitate positive (or at least
minimally traumatic) victim involvement in the investigation
and prosecution of their exploiters? Was the legal process
comprehensible to the victim? Did it support access to
entitlements such as compensation and right to stay in the
destination country? Did victims value the criminal justice
response? Did the intervention result in any unintended and/
or negative consequences, for example, increased likelihood
of prosecution for status-related offences such as illegal work
or illegal stay?
. Victim support agencies: Victim support agency views of
success may not always align with those of trafficked persons.
In addition to the above success criteria, victim support
agencies may consider whether the intervention reflected well
on them and their work; whether it advanced particular
institutional or programmatic goals; whether it brought in
additional funding or increased the prospect of future funding;
and whether it improved working relations with criminal justice
agencies.
If the perspectives of suspects and offenders were considered
important to judgments of success, relevant criteria could include
whether the intervention supported fair trial rights and proportionate
sentencing; whether it contributed to correct procedures being followed
in the legal process; and whether the treatment of suspects has
improved. Additional and different perspectives may include those of
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the evaluators, whose primary focus would likely be on the extent to
which the intervention secured its stated aims, performed against its
predetermined indicators and demonstrated value for money. Technical
experts and others attached to the implementing agency might have a
different view of what constitutes success, which may (or may not)
intersect and overlap with some of the views outlined above.
Finally, in this area, it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of
silent stakeholders who, while not formally associated with the
intervention, nevertheless make their own judgment of success and
potentially sway the perspectives of others. A conspicuous example is
the United States government, which engages in a controversial but
highly influential annual evaluation of state responses to trafficking.7
While the task of evaluating state responses to trafficking is different
from evaluating the impact of a specific intervention, there are
important connections and overlaps. The United States mechanism
uses a range of success criteria that prioritises stronger criminal justice
responses, evidenced by institution building and increases in
prosecutions and convictions. This process may well affect the
perspective of key stakeholders, such as recipient states and criminal
justice agencies, on the success of any external intervention. Its role
as a major donor in the area of criminal justice responses to trafficking
has provided the United States government with an additional avenue
through which to advocate its particular vision of “success”.  Australia
provides another example of a donor with a strong international
presence in this area and the demonstrated capacity to influence how
states—and even a regional grouping of states—determine success.8
8 See: Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Progress Report on
Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons in the ASEAN Region,
ASEAN, Jakarta, 2011 (examining state and regional performance against
detailed performance criteria developed with Australian government support).
7 In 2000, the United States Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act (TVPA) requiring its State Department to issue annual
reports describing ‘the nature and extent of severe forms of trafficking in
persons’ and assessing governmental efforts across the world to combat such
trafficking against criteria established by United States law. The TVPA lays
down “minimum standards” for the elimination of trafficking as well as detailed
criteria for evaluating the performance of states. The reports use a ranking
system to classify all states reviewed into four tiers of counter-trafficking
compliance. Any bottom-tier state, being one that does not comply with the
minimum standards and that is not making significant efforts to do so, may be
subject to a range of economic sanctions. See further, A Gallagher, ‘Improving
the Effectiveness of the International Law of Human Trafficking: A vision for
the future of the U.S. TIP Reports’ 12 Human Rights Review, 2011, http://
works.bepress.com/anne_gallagher/16/.
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2. Dealing with conflicting and divergent opinions on
success
Within stakeholder groups, there may be internal differences as to
what constitutes a successful outcome and, even at the individual
level, views on what constitutes “success” may change over time and
in response to different contexts. Some victims, for example, may
view the conviction of their exploiter after a long and personally difficult
legal process, as a positive (and even empowering) result. For others,
the process may be so profoundly disorienting and disempowering that
even a successful prosecution cannot assuage their dissatisfaction. As
noted above, victim support agency views of success may not align
with those of trafficking victims. The issue of shelter detention for
victims of trafficking provides a relevant example, with a recent study
confirming a sharp divergence in views amongst support agencies,
and between support agencies and victims regarding the value and
impact of shelter detention.9
The perspectives of certain stakeholders are often prioritised in
evaluating criminal justice interventions in the counter-trafficking
sector, while other perspectives are marginalised or discounted. In
many externally funded interventions, donors exercise a tight grip
over the structure, composition and implementation of evaluations,
not least to ensure that their views and interests are given due
attention. In other interventions, it is the implementing agency that
controls the evaluation process—a conflict of interest that is rarely
remarked upon. For example, the evaluation of the UN Global Initiative
to Fight Trafficking (UN GIFT) was organised by and involved UNODC,
the agency responsible for implementing this large, multi-donor
programme. Donor or implementing agency control over the evaluation
process can translate into a capacity to ensure that inconvenient
evidence-based conclusions are downplayed or ignored.10
9 A Gallagher and E Pearson, ‘The High Cost of Freedom: A legal and policy analysis
of shelter detention for victims of trafficking’ Human Rights Quarterly, vol.
32, 2010, pp. 73—114.
10 M Dottridge, ‘Research Needs Concerning the Monitoring, Evaluation and
Impact Assessment of Both Research about Human Trafficking and Projects
and Programmes to Address Human Trafficking’ in C Aghazarm, F Laczko, et
al., Human Trafficking: New directions for research, IOM, Geneva, 2008, pp.
57—71, 65—66.
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Research for the present article found that it is the views of the most
direct and easily accessible programme beneficiaries (for example,
the criminal justice officials and agencies that are the target of the
intervention) that are most consistently sought out and taken into
account. This can skew evaluation outcomes, particularly when the
claims of such groups are not tested against the views of others, as
these programme beneficiaries may be reluctant to criticise an
intervention because of appreciation for assistance provided and/or a
fear that such assistance could be withdrawn if negatively assessed.11
In none of the examined criminal justice evaluations were the views
of victims or suspects sought or considered. Of course, a failure to
consult these groups does not automatically mean that such perspectives
are completely ignored. For example, most of the criminal justice
experts interviewed for this study explained that their assessment of
the success or failure of a project, activity or single case was tied to
their perception of how the intervention impacted victims and/or
suspects. It is essential to acknowledge, however, that this perception
may differ substantially from how victims or suspects themselves assess
success or failure.
Cost, time and access considerations clearly play a part in deciding
who, among stakeholders, should be involved in the evaluation process.
Access to some stakeholders, such as criminal justice practitioners
and victim support agencies, may be easier, less costly and less time
consuming to secure than others. Certainly, the involvement of
trafficked persons and suspects in any evaluation is likely to be very
complex and expensive. For example, sufficient time is needed to
identify a representative sample of the target group, secure informed
consent and develop rapport necessary for safe, ethical and useful
interviewing. Such factors may go some way towards explaining why
these more complicated stakeholders are routinely omitted from
consultations.12 The possibility that the more difficult-to-reach groups
are accorded a lower priority, and that resource and other constraints
are used as an excuse to exclude them, should also not be discounted.13
11 A Brunovskis and R Surtees, Leaving the Past Behind? When trafficking victims
decline assistance, NEXUS Institute, Oslo, Fafo and Vienna, 2007, p. 105.
12 These practical obstacles are rarely acknowledged and it is ethical issues,
such as the risk of re-traumatisation, that are most commonly cited as a
reason not to interview victims directly. While certainly a critical consideration
in any engagement with trafficked persons, it is important that ethical
concerns do not become an excuse for avoiding work that is sensitive and
difficult. Trafficked persons have a right to be part of any evaluation, and the
risk of wasteful and even harmful interventions is clearly increased when the
experiences, assessment and needs of victims are not part of an evaluation.
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Results of an intervention can be interpreted differently, depending
on individual perspective, background and expertise, with widely
diverging assessments of what constitutes a “successful” outcome.
Consider the real-life example of an externally supported cross-border
law enforcement cooperation mechanism that, somewhat unexpectedly,
was linked to a significant number of victim rescues. While the donor
regarded victim rescues to be a strong indicator of success, technical
experts within the project had a different, more nuanced view. They
pointed out that this figure revealed nothing about: the number of
victims who were not rescued (including those who continued to be
exploited with the knowledge of national counterparts with whom the
intervention was working); the extent to which “rescues” translated
into victims being offered and accepting assistance; the cost of the
cooperation process relative to alternative strategies; the time and
effort put into making it work; and the apparent inability of the
cooperation process to facilitate the identification and arrest of
suspects.
Another example of conflicting perspectives of success is provided by
the common measure of trafficking prosecutions, considered further
in the following section. For present purposes, it is relevant to note
that the arrest, prosecution and conviction of traffickers are heavily
dependent on the cooperation of victims. However, trafficking victims’
involvement in the criminal justice process may involve significant
and on-going risks to their personal safety and physical and emotional
well-being, for little or no personal benefit. As a result, victim
cooperation must either be compelled or secured very carefully, through,
in the words of an experienced law enforcement practitioner, ‘a mixture
of encouragement, persuasion and lack of information’. Under these
circumstances, it is very likely that trafficked persons and criminal
justice agencies will feel very differently about the impact and value
of a criminal justice intervention that seeks to enhance the capacity
of investigators and prosecutors to bring victims into the criminal
justice process as witnesses. That conflicting perspective is likely to
be lost, at least in the context of formal performance evaluations
conducted by criminal justice agencies, (i) because of the routine failure
to seek the views of victim-witnesses; and (ii) because a primary goal
(increased victim involvement in prosecutions) was likely set with little
consideration of victim perspective.
13 M Bamberger and J Rugh, ‘Real World Evaluation. Working under budget, time,
data and political constraints’, American Evaluation Association: Professional
Development Workshop Session 21, 2008, 7.
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One interviewee characterised the current situation, with its multiple
stakeholders and multiple perspectives, as creating ‘a messy soup of
expectations’ that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to manage
successfully. Certainly, a strong evaluation should take into account
different views and positions. However, not all stakeholders are equal
and not all perspectives are, or should be, of equal weight. For example,
international human rights law provides a strong framework within
which many aspects of a counter-trafficking intervention could and
should be measured.14 An approach to evaluation that prioritises human
rights of victims and the administration of criminal justice can provide
the framework within which different considerations of success can
be weighed. As a practical matter, an appropriate balancing of interests
also requires that criteria for success (discussed further below) are
transparent and logical; that all major stakeholders are identified and
consulted; and that different perceptions of the programme and its
success are openly acknowledged in the evaluation, even when this
diverges from the general assessment.
3. Deciding the criteria for success
In some cases examined, criteria for success of a counter-trafficking
criminal justice intervention were not articulated at all. However, such
criteria are typically made formal and explicit, attached to the relevant
project or programme as objectives, together with predetermined
indicators. Of course, this does not prevent unarticulated criteria from
influencing an evaluation. For example, while pre-determined indicators
are unlikely to extend to the question of whether the intervention has
served a donor’s political or strategic interests, this measure of success
may nevertheless be deeply entrenched in the evaluation process and
its conclusions. Nevertheless, it is the intervention’s formal indicators
that, at least in principle, determine whether or not “success” has
been achieved.
Several experts interviewed for this study identified the absence of
an agreed set of standards that define a successful counter-trafficking
criminal justice response as a major problem—an issue that is raised
in the conclusion of this article. One participant, for example, noted
14 See below note 30 and accompanying text.
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the lack of agreement on what constitutes progress: ‘It’s not that we
can’t measure impact because of our starting point, it’s because we
don’t actually know our end point, where we’re trying to get to.’ Other
problems include the adoption of unrealistic or unclear objectives,
formulated in ways that make evaluation of outcomes or impact virtually
impossible. Examples cited included high-sounding objectives (for
example, “to eliminate trafficking”) or those that are extremely vague
(for example, “to develop more effective criminal justice responses”).
Interviewees also pointed to an apparently widespread preference for
weak or easily attainable goals—such as whether the programme has
been implemented as planned—rather than whether it is able to
demonstrate change and impact.15 This preference for process-related
goals over those focused on outcomes enables stakeholders, most
particularly implementing agencies and donors, to retain control over
the “success story” in a highly uncertain environment by ensuring that
evaluative measurement extends only to aspects that are under the
direct control of the project or intervention.
Definitions of success in criminal justice responses to trafficking
almost invariably fall back on what can be measured, hence the strong
preference, particularly among donors, for quantifiable indicators such
as number of arrests or prosecutions, number of officials trained,
instances of cross-border investigation cooperation, number of special
interview suites established, number of relevant treaties ratified, etc.
One criminal justice specialist expressed frustration that ‘results have
become so important—and the more concrete they are, the more they
are appreciated’, even when the basis of these results may be weak or
flawed. Another highlighted how this preference for the measurable
can have negative implications in an environment where ‘even bad
data is [considered] better than no data at all’.16 One evaluation expert
15 Rosenberg notes that this is also the case in almost all of the protection
programmes reviewed for an assessment of trafficking programmes in the
Europe and Eurasia region: R Rosenberg, Best Practices for Programming to
Protect and Assist Victims of Trafficking in Europe and Eurasia, USAID/E&E/
DGST, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 34.
16 See, for example, the response of a major United Nations agency to data
quality problems in the context of its global trafficking report: ‘A poor indicator
is better than no indicator as long as it is not represented as more than it is.
Over time, the collection of information from so many different perspectives
can, in aggregate, make up for many of the deficiencies of the data itself. Our
global data set, reviewed time and again, can indeed tell us something more
about the trends and patterns of the problem. This information is vital so
that, in a world of limited resources, efforts can be focused for maximum
effect.’ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons, Vienna, 2009, p. 13.
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with experience in counter-trafficking interventions criticised the
strong donor preference for (often poor quality) quantification over a
more sophisticated and robust mix of qualitative and quantitative
methods.
4. Interrogating underlying values and assumptions
Views on an intervention’s success often depend on underlying values
and assumptions. Criminal justice interventions in the counter-
trafficking field are rife with untested assumptions about the value of
a particular approach, and about stakeholders and beneficiaries that
are rarely explicitly articulated. Any credible evaluation should extend
to considering whether the underlying assumptions of an intervention
are valid.17 Some of these assumptions, as they relate to how an
intervention’s success is measured, are considered further below.
Assumption 1: Increases in trafficking-related
prosecutions/convictions is a strong and reliable indicator
of success
As noted previously, an increase in trafficking-related prosecutions is
widely viewed to indicate a more effective criminal justice response
to trafficking.18 Certainly this indicator should not be dismissed
outright. The failure of states to arrest and prosecute exploiters has
likely contributed to the high levels of impunity currently enjoyed by
traffickers and to the widespread denial of justice to victims.
However, an increase in measurable criminal justice activity (arrests,
prosecutions and convictions) is a crude and potentially misleading
success indicator. For example, changes in prosecution rates may be
attributable to new trafficking laws, with offences previously charged
under other laws, such as sexual assault, pimping, immigration fraud,
17 R Surtees, Re/integration of Trafficked Persons: Developing monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms, KBF, Brussels, and NEXUS Institute, Washington, 2009,
p. 19.
18 United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Reports: 2001-
2010, United States Department of State Washington, DC, (2001)—(2010);
UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, UNODC, Vienna, 2009; IOM,
Handbook on Performance Indicators for Counter-Trafficking Projects, IOM,
Geneva, 2008.
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now prosecuted as trafficking. They may also reflect changes in
trafficking prevalence as well as the way data is collected. Most
importantly, numerical information says nothing about the quality of
prosecutions and convictions, discussed further below. A number of
respondents argued that the emphasis on increased prosecutions and
convictions has resulted in unintended consequences—for example, a
focus on “easy” cases such as those involving small-time recruiters,
and a misidentification of people smugglers or marriage brokers as
traffickers in order to boost the number of trafficking cases pursued.19
There is some recent acknowledgment of the need to focus on the
quality of prosecutions and convictions. Success indicators recently
developed through one major criminal justice intervention in South-
East Asia and subsequently adopted at the regional level, consider
whether the procedural guarantees for a fair trial were provided;
whether evidentiary requirements were met; and whether convictions
result in adequate and proportionate penalties.20 The International
Organization for Migration’s manual of performance indicators suggests
convictions as an indicator of success, with the caveat that this
assumes a definition of trafficking that is in line with international
standards and, critically, a credible justice system that respects due
process.21
Assumption 2: Declines in prevalence of trafficking
indicates positive change
While the prevalence of crime (the extent or proportion of cases in
any given population) is not necessarily a routine indicator for criminal
justice interventions,22 there appears to be a growing assumption that
a decline in the prevalence of trafficking (presumably evidenced by
the number of identified victims) is a useful indicator of success. The
United States Trafficking in Persons Report, for example, implies a
19 See, for example, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Progress
Report on Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons in the ASEAN
Region, ASEAN, Jakarta, 2011.
20 Ibid., Chapters 1 and 6.
21 IOM, Handbook on Performance Indicators for Counter-trafficking Projects,
IOM, Geneva, 2008, p. 38.
22 Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), Helpdesk
Research Report: Prevalence as an indicator for counter-forced labour and
counter-sex trafficking projects, GSDRC, 2008, p. 2.
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prevalence measurement in establishing, as success criteria, ‘whether
[the government under assessment] achieves appreciable progress in
eliminating severe forms of trafficking when compared to…the previous
year’.23
The use of prevalence as an indicator is problematic on a number of
levels. It does not take into account well-known obstacles and pitfalls
associated with quantifying the extent of the trafficking problem.24 It
also fails to acknowledge that even if prevalence could be accurately
measured, changes can easily be attributed to a range of factors beyond
the rate at which trafficking is actually occurring. For example,
increased attention given to trafficking could result in higher levels of
prevalence being recorded. Similarly, increased numbers of identified
and assisted victims could well be a partial measure of a country’s
efforts to tackle trafficking.25
Further, decreased prevalence may not necessarily signal success but
rather the adaptation of trafficking systems to counter-trafficking
responses. Consider a recent attempt to use prevalence of child
prostitution to measure the success of a criminal justice counter-
trafficking intervention targeting child trafficking. The research sought
to map prevalence but, as noted by its authors, a measurable change
in prevalence may be due to other factors, such as law enforcement
pressures that resulted in victims being shifted to new or less visible
locations. 26
23 United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2010, United
States Department of State, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 405.
24 See, for example, USGAO, Human Trafficking: Better data, strategy, and
reporting needed to enhance U.S. antitrafficking efforts abroad, USGAO,
Washington, DC, 2006; E Savona and S Stefanizzi (eds), Measuring Human
Trafficking Complexities and Pitfalls, Springer Science, New York, 2007; D
Feingold, ‘Trafficking in Numbers: The social construction of human trafficking
data’ in P Andreas and L Greenhill (eds), Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The
politics of numbers in global crime and conflict, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, 2010, p. 46—74; H Ali, ‘Data Collection on Victims of Human Trafficking:
An analysis of various sources’ Journal of Human Security, vol. 6, no. 1, 2010,
p. 55—69.
25 R Surtees, Second Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South-Eastern
Europe, IOM, Geneva, 2005, p. 25.
26 A Jones et al., An Evaluation of the International Justice Mission’s “Project
Lantern”: Assessment of five-year impact and change in the public justice
system, International Justice Mission, 2010, p. 6, 31.
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27 Center for Global Development, When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives
Through Impact Evaluation, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC,
2010, p. 20.
28 M Friedman, ‘This story could have been written 10 years ago. We need to do
more.’ Rights Work: www.rightswork.org, online publication, 15 August 2011;
A Jordan, ‘More funding for impact assessments?’ Rights Work:
www.rightswork.org, online publication, 15 October 2010; GAATW, C Hames, F
Dewar, and R Napier-Moore, Feeling Good about Feeling Bad… A global review
of evaluation in counter-trafficking initiatives, GAATW, Bangkok, 2010.
29 J Intili, et al., An Evaluation Framework for USAID-Funded TIP Prevention and
Victim Protection Programs, Social Transition Team, Office of Democracy,
Governance and Social Transition of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID/E&E/DGST), Washington, DC, 2009, p. 20.
The assumption about prevalence also works in reverse: that increases
in prevalence are indicative of failure. However, as one study of impact
evaluation has noted, success can also mean doing less badly.27 It is
not unreasonable to assume that, at least in some parts of the world,
the rate at which individuals are being trafficked is increasing. Under
such circumstances, the best that an intervention may be able to hope
for is to slow down that rate.
Assumption 3: Impact and key success indicators (such as
attitudinal change) can be measured accurately and within
the life of an intervention
Assumptions and expectations about what can be measured (and when)
are often unrealistic. Calls for interventions to demonstrate impact28
often underestimate, or indeed completely overlook, many of the
complexities involved, at least within the specialist area of criminal
justice responses.
Data quality and accessibility: If evaluation design and implementation
are compromised by missing data or poor analysis, the findings will be
inadequate and likely irrelevant.29 In many countries, vital information
(for example, about rates of trafficking, number, type, quality of
investigations, arrests, prosecutions, convictions, protection orders,
etc.) is scarce, unreliable and not always verifiable. This severely
compromises the capacity of criminal justice interventions to collect
baseline information against which future change can be assessed.
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Timing: Several criminal justice professionals interviewed questioned
the assumption that impact could be measured, at least within the life
of a project or immediately afterwards. They noted that trafficking
cases can take years from reception of a complaint to case resolution
in court. The results and impacts of interventions that seek to influence
criminal justice responses can only fully be measured once the entire
process has been completed and in respect to a substantial group of
cases. When project objectives are cast, in the words of one evaluation
expert, ‘at the upper end of the logic model’, impact becomes ‘virtually
impossible to measure unless you put some sort of longitudinal study
in place which lasts for a couple of decades’.
Measuring change in attitude and behaviour: Many externally supported
criminal justice interventions seek to change the attitudes and
behaviour of criminal justice personnel as well as its organisational
culture. Such changes do not happen quickly. Any evidence to
demonstrate change will likely only come from the way cases are
investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated over an extended time period.
In short, the true impact of capacity building interventions such as
training is unlikely to be immediately discernible. One criminal justice
adviser highlighted this obstacle, noting that changes in behaviour
attributable to skills training in which he was involved were not
detectable in counterparts or external observers until at least several
years after such training commenced.
Other practical obstacles to measuring changes within the confines of
a typical project should not be underestimated. The difficulties are
neatly illustrated by one project that has invested heavily in following
up law enforcement trainees to assess change in workplace behaviour
and thereby move beyond reliance on the one-sided and frequently
inconclusive feedback received from trainees themselves. Project staff
involved in this evaluation experienced a range of practical difficulties
in monitoring workplace performance. Supervisors were rarely available
for consultation and, regardless, generally lacked the knowledge and
skills to be able to adequately assess the performance and capacities
of their subordinates on the relevant issues. In some instances, trained
officers had conducted few, if any, trafficking investigations since
undertaking the training, thereby preventing a comparison with past
performance or behaviour. Compounding these problems was the fact
that the basic data required to measure changes in performance or
behaviour was often inaccessible or unavailable in a form that could
be analysed.
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Towards the Future
Recent calls for more rigour and transparency in evaluating the success
or failure of counter-trafficking interventions are both welcome and
overdue. The need for quality evaluations, including impact
evaluations, felt across the development spectrum, appears to be
especially acute in the area of criminal justice responses to trafficking.
While human exploitation is an age-old phenomenon, this issue has
only recently been identified as a priority for states and the international
community. States have been developing and adapting their criminal
justice responses on the run, often under strong political pressure,
and principally through trial and error. Donors and implementing
agencies have been operating in a similarly reactive way. This increases
the risk of bad decisions and negative consequences. It also makes
apparent the urgency of ensuring that robust systems for evaluating
interventions are in place and functioning.
A review of the relevant literature confirms that it is much easier to
call for more quality in evaluations than it is to actually craft or deliver
concrete solutions. Discussions about evaluating counter-trafficking
interventions need to move from the important first step of criticism
and complaint about what is not being done well (or at all) to serious,
informed engagement with obstacles and constraints, and how these
can be addressed. A different approach also requires commitment to
new levels of openness and transparency. Donors and implementing
agencies in particular have a responsibility to contribute to an
environment of learning and self-reflection that will help ensure good
practices are replicated and poor ones discarded. The publication and
dissemination of their evaluation reports should be seen as a critical
first step to any serious engagement. It will also be important to
recognise that, at least in development terms, many of the challenges
of evaluating counter-trafficking interventions are not especially unique
and there is considerable space for those working in this area to learn
from the experiences and insights of other fields of work.
One of the main impediments to effective evaluations lies in the failure
of states, the international community and the counter-trafficking
sector to specify and communicate a common vision of what constitutes
an effective criminal justice response to trafficking. For example, it
is only rarely that success indicators will link to the increasingly
sophisticated international legal and policy framework around
trafficking that provides detailed and specific guidance on matters
such as victims’ right to justice and state obligations to exercise due
diligence in investigating trafficking, prosecuting perpetrators and
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protecting those who have been trafficked.30 The absence of a unified
vision, grounded in accepted international rules, manifests itself in
the lack of clearly defined end-points that are typical of most criminal
justice interventions. It also exacerbates complications such as the
presence of multiple and divergent stakeholders, and difficulties in
accessing reliable and verifiable data. Even more worryingly, the lack
of an overarching vision allows mediocre or even harmful interventions
to flourish and good work to go unrecognised and unrewarded. It is a
collective responsibility to work towards articulation of this vision and
to ensure accountability of those who are provided the resources to
promote its realisation.
30 For further explanation of this framework, see A Gallagher, The International
Law of Human Trafficking (2010), especially at Chapter 7. One example of an
explicit attempt to integrate international principles and standards into
success criteria for counter-trafficking interventions in the criminal justice
sector is provided by ASEAN (2011), supra note 10. See also AIM for Human
Rights (2010), The RighT Guide: A tool to measure the impact of counter-
trafficking laws and policies which, while not focusing specifically on either
external interventions or the criminal justice response, provides an important
insight into how evaluation can be modified by the integration of a human
rights perspective.
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